National and international organisations have implemented governance mechanisms to address a diversity of ethical, security and policy challenges raised by advances in research and innovation. These challenges become particularly complex when research or innovations are considered 'dualuse', i.e. can lead to both beneficial and harmful uses, and in particular, civilian (peaceful) and military (hostile) applications. While many countries have mechanisms (i.e. export controls) to govern the transfer of dual-use technology (e.g. nuclear, cryptography), it is much less clear how dual-use research from across the range of academic disciplines can or should be governed. Using the Canadian research and policy context as case study, this paper will first, examine the governance mechanisms currently in place to mitigate the negative implications of dual-use research and innovation; second, compare these with other relevant international governance contexts; and finally, propose some ways forward (i.e. a risk analysis approach) for developing more robust governance mechanisms.
Introduction
After the Asian avian flu outbreak in 1997, researchers increased their efforts to better understand the H5N1 flu virus. But these research initiatives, some of which included the creation of hybrid mammalian-avian flu viruses, were said to have opened a 'Pandora's box' (Enserink 2004) . In the process of working to better understand the virus, researchers experimented with the creation of more virulent strains, something that was accomplished in 2011 by teams in the USA (the Kawaoka team) and in the Netherlands (the Fouchier team). To prevent potential misuse-particularly with regards to bioterrorism-the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) and the Dutch government recommended that part of this research not be published (Fidler 2012) , and a temporary-but still on-going-moratorium on certain aspects of bird flu research was agreed to by researchers while issues of biosecurity could be discussed (Kelland and Nebehay 2012) . The initial request to not publish and/or censor data in the Kawaoka and Fouchier papers created controversy in the scientific community, where the diffusion of research results is normally considered essential to the scientific process-i.e. to validate/invalidate research findings and 'truth' claims amongst the scientific community-and the basis for the advancement of knowledge (Fouchier et al. 2012) . While the NSABB and the Dutch government eventually approved publication of the studies-published in the journals Nature (Imai et al. 2012) and Science )-once again the controversial nature of the research brought academic and public policy attention to H5N1, both with regards to the issues of open scientific communication, freedom to publish (Enserink and Cohen 2012; Keim 2012a) , and the need to regulate laboratory biosecurity standards (Enserink 2012; Keim 2012b ).
Discussions about the need for (bio)security or regulatory measures for research that can present potentially serious risks to public safety are not exclusive to the health sciences (e.g. recombinant DNA, genomics); they are also relevant to many other areas of research in the natural sciences (e.g. nuclear energy, quantum theory), the applied sciences (e.g. data encryption, nanotechnology), and the social sciences (e.g. social marketing, cultural profiling). Scientific discoveries and technological innovations are rarely if ever 'neutral' or 'value-free', nor are they ever only 'good' or 'bad'. Instead, science and technology are invariably imbedded in complex social, cultural and political contexts that shape how research findings and innovations are accepted, transformed or rejected by a range of actors, including researchers, industry, government and civil society (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999; Webster 1991) .
In the last few decades, many national and international organisations have implemented regulations and other governance mechanisms to address the socio-ethical, security and public policy implications of scientific research and innovation, often with the involvement of science policy advisory commissions, research ethics boards, or working groups of learned societies. Regardless of whether these diverse governance mechanisms are categorised as academic/scientific integrity, responsible conduct of research, academic accountability or research ethics, they share a concern for finding practical mechanisms to prevent misconduct and to promote ethical practices in academic research and technological innovation and application.
Yet, numerous difficult questions remain unanswered. When does a specific line of research or innovation become problematic (e.g. overly risky or harmful), and according to what values and from whose perspective? What responsibilities do researchers have (e.g. towards their governments or to society) beyond ensuring that their work meets the highest academic standards? What limits can or should institutions, funders or governments impose on academic freedom and knowledge dissemination in order to protect national security? When does a discovery or a technological innovation acquire good (beneficial) and/or bad (harmful) characteristics: all along the developmental pathway or only at application? Does the potential for harmful (bad) application negate the benefits (good) acquired during development? These challenges become particularly complex when, whether intentionally or unintentionally, research or innovations are considered 'dual-use', i.e. can lead to both beneficial and harmful uses (Bezuidenhout 2013) , and in particular, civilian (peaceful) and military (hostile) applications (McLeish and Nightingale 2005) .
Not surprisingly, many nations have regulations to control the transfer of technologies or material known to have dual-use civilian/military potential, e.g. through export controls and national or international monitoring. But what happens when the dual-use potential of a line of research, or of an innovation, is not evident or is unintended? Who should oversee or regulate the dissemination or transfer of scientific knowledge that may have dual-use potential and how should it be done? To begin addressing some of these questions, we present the Canadian research and policy context as a case study with which to examine the governance of dual-use research and innovation. This case is particularly interesting because Canada is a leader in both science and technology innovation (Government of Canada 2012; Government of Canada (Science Technology and Innovation Council) 2011), and in the development of research ethics and scientific integrity frameworks While advisory boards and policies have already been created and implemented in the USA, Canada is still in the process of developing its stance on dual-use, which makes an analysis of its current policy context of particular interest.
In Canada, as in other developed nations (e.g. the USA, the UK), research and innovation occurs in both the private and public sectors. Thus it is likely that federal or provincial government departments or agencies (e.g. Defence R&D Canada, Public Safety Canada, Public Health Agency Canada), as well as industry (e.g. the pharmaceutical companies, engineering firms) are involved in various forms of dual-use research and innovation. For the purposes of this paper, we have chosen to focus our analysis on the governance mechanisms that could apply to research conducted in the academic context (e.g. research centres, universities). This limitation is justified by the diversity and quantity of research that occurs in the academic setting, but also by the important ethical challenges that arise when the norms of academic liberty and open science confront the need to regulate dual-use research and innovation.
In this paper, we provide a succinct overview of Canadian and international policies and mechanisms that can help mitigate the negative implications of dual-use research and innovation. Specifically, we describe how dual-use research and innovation is dealt with in Canada and internationally, and propose some points for consideration and ways forward for the development of more robust governance mechanisms.
Method
Between January and March 2012, we conducted a comprehensive interdisciplinary scoping review of the academic and grey literature (during the last ten years) in research ethics and scientific integrity, in order to situate current debates about dual-use research and innovation. Using a broad internet search (PubMed, Google/Google Scholar) for keywords such as 'dual-use', 'secondary use', 'weapons of mass destruction', 'biosecurity', 'export controls', and 'malevolent use', we selected more than 90 academic articles, reports and websites. The aim was to understand the history of 'dual-use' and its various applications (e.g. 'dual-use research', 'dual-use technology', 'dual-use dilemma', 'dual-use services'), as well as the ethical norms or principles at stake in reflections about why, how and who should govern dual-use research and innovation. We then performed a comprehensive mapping of research ethics, scientific integrity, and responsible conduct of research guidelines and frameworks in Canada, and compared these with other relevant international governance contexts (e.g. the USA, the EU, Australia), with a view to identifying particularities in Canadian governance mechanisms. This overview was limited to publicly accessible policies: unwritten practices or policies of a confidential/secret nature were excluded.
Defining 'dual-use': A historical overview
In the last 100 years advances in science have dramatically increased the scientific research in all areas, which has been accompanied by a heightened awareness of the potential for the misuse/abuse of sensitive information and/or reagents and methodologies. The concept of dual-use came to a fore in the years leading up to the Second World War in the field of atomic sciences. The awareness that the same piece of research could be used for good as well as bad purposes led many scientists to question the ethical validity of their activities. (Bezuidenhout 2013: 84) Historically, 'dual-use' has been defined as:
. . . technology, equipment, and facilities that could be used for both civilian and military purposes. (Miller 2009: 23) The focus has been on the downstream products of research in the nuclear sciences (Evans 2010) , in information technology, and more recently in the biosciences (D'Agostino and Martin 2009). Much less attention has been paid to upstream elements of research (e.g. fundamental and applied research, information sharing) that are common to academic research and distant from realworld application. This focus on downstream dual-use innovations is evident when looking at past discoveries with dual-use potential (see Fig. 1 and Table 1) .
From the outset, the motivation for defining dual-use involved a desire to restrict the scope of the term to a specific area of research or technology of concern, in order to develop guidelines or regulations to frame the conduct of such research or the use of particular technologies. While definitions of 'dual-use' are still a primary point of discussion and discord in the academic and policy communities, plausible definitions include research or science that:
. . . has both civilian and military applications . . . (Fergusson 2009; Robinson 2012) and/or that:
. . . can be used for both beneficial/good and harmful/bad purposes. (Berns et al. 2012; Kuhlau et al. 2011) The first definition is extremely wide in scope and so can include research that might not be problematic (e.g. research that leads to both legitimate military purposes and positive civilian applications, such as the internet). This definition is also descriptive and implicitly non-judgmental unless one views military applications of researchwhether developed and used by nation states or terrorist groups-as negative and civilian applications as positive. The second definition is equally broad but explicitly normative. This raises the problem of determining criteria by which to judge research or innovations as 'beneficial' or 'harmful'. Furthermore, scholars such as Selgelid (2009) and van der Bruggen (2011) argue for the need to specify in definitions of dual-use, researchers' intentions and the possible consequences of research and innovations. Following the approach taken by Selgelid (2009), we combine the above definitions and define 'dual-use' as:
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. . . research that may intentionally or unintentionally have both beneficial and harmful applications or consequences.
There are (at least) two levels of intention, i.e. that of the researcher/innovator and that of an end-user. A researcher/innovator may intend one purpose and not imagine that a user might transform the research or innovation for other purposes. Equally, a researcher may have no particular end-use in mind. We also expand somewhat the scope of dual-use by adding a clarification that it:
. . . includes knowledge, processes, and technologies from the natural and applied sciences, the health sciences, and the social sciences.
This broader definition, we suggest, can better take account of research in the applied and social sciences that can or should be considered dual-use, and which has traditionally been ignored.
Examples from diverse fields of research
There are numerous examples in the literature about particular fields of research, largely in the natural sciences, and more recently in the biosciences, that raise dual-use concerns. Table 2 summarizes a broader range of examples, including some from the social sciences. . Production and use of first atomic bomb . Research on biological weapons by USA, Russia, UK, Japan etc.
1940-90
. National technology policies were based primarily on national security. Economics was a secondary concern (Galev 2003) After 1990 . Reorientation of technology policies towards a more global trading system (Galev 2003 (Galev ) 1990 . . WHO Geneva Meeting about H5N1 research and moratorium (Kelland and Nebehay 2012) Although the term 'dual-use' has not been commonly used in the social sciences literature, this does not mean that research and applications in those disciplines cannot be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes, including military applications: there is, for example, growing discussion around the ethics of 'secondary use' in social science research. Data and materials (e.g. interview recordings, videos, data sets) are research tools that support, enrich and stimulate the development of university research, the sharing of which aligns with a general movement promoting openness across the sciences for the benefit of society (Fischer and Zigmond 2010; Neylon and Wu 2009) . It is possible to add value to important research resources by sharing them in the research community, by organising them in collections or by ensuring their commercialisation where possible (Grise´2005). This value-added secondary use-be it scientific, social or economic-is increasingly important in our 'knowledge economies'. The development of knowledge and on-going technological innovations, previously seen as independent from the system of production and the marketplace, have become important factors in nations' economic viability (Peters 2008) . Similarly, the term 'knowledge societies' has been used by UNESCO (2005) to define a society where knowledge benefits not only a population's economic needs, but also its social, ethical and political needs. However, promoting openness and sharing may also open the door for research, data and methods to be used for purposes that could be both beneficial and harmful.
There are numerous examples of research and innovations that can be or have been used for both malevolent and benevolent purposes. The most obvious is fundamental and applied research in nuclear physics that led to the creation of ground-breaking medical imaging equipment (e.g. X-rays and magnetic resonance imaging), cancer treatments such as radiation therapy, and powerful sources of energy for the community (e.g. nuclear reactors). The same science also led to the development of the atomic bomb, nuclear weapons, and radioactive contamination of the environment (e.g. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima).
Less obvious, but equally problematic even if the harms may be different, is research in nanotechnology, neurology and psychology, fields that individually or in combination can lead to research and innovation that can be put to both 'good' and 'bad' use. For example, brain implants used for deep brain stimulation (DBS) were developed in the 1980s and then commercialised by Medtronic to treat Parkinson's disease. By 1997, DBS had become a standard last resort treatment for Parkinson's, but was then extended for treatment of essential tremor, dystonia and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and clinical trials are on-going for its use in the treatment of major depression that is refractory to medications (Bell et al. 2008) . Given the technology's ability to treat, i.e. shape, 'deviant' social behaviour (e.g. OCD, some addictions), it is not unthinkable that DBS could stimulate research into other potentially contentious applications (Bell et al. 2009 ), such as enhancing cognitive performance or controlling the impulsiveness associated with criminality.
Continuing with chip technologies, radio frequency identification tags-which enable simple passive/semipassive wireless data transfer-have become ubiquitous in consumer products of all sorts (e.g. to prevent shoplifting), in automatic toll systems, and in personal security (e.g. identification/access cards, passports). These chips have also been used as implantable devices (placed under . Public health (prevention) . Biodefence (prevention) . Governing 'dual-use' research in Canada . 5 of 18 the skin) to track companion animals (Ntafis et al. 2008) , and by extension, have been considered for human use in the management of dementia or Alzheimer's patients, and to track children and so monitor behaviour and prevent abduction (Wyld 2010) , raising evident ethical and civil liberties concerns (Gasson et al. 2012 ).
On a different note, while ethnographic cultural research might enable researchers to develop a better understanding of a community, this knowledge can also lead to better ways of exploiting that same community through marketing (e.g. by industry) or ethnographic profiling (e.g. by government agencies). A classic example is the book by Condominas (1965) , which was translated into English and read by the American military in their preparation for the war in Vietnam. Furious, Condominas added, in a preface to a subsequent edition, a vigorous denunciation of the American methods and their use of an ethnographic text to engage in the 'ethnocide' (a concept of Condominas) of the Mnong Gar people. Many other examples exist of social science research on sensitive topics (e.g. criminality, underground economies) or involving marginal and thus potentially vulnerable populations (e.g. Native or Aboriginal peoples; immigrant populations; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities), the results of which can both advance scientific knowledge and benefit these groups (e.g. through better access to government services or public recognition) but also put them at significant risk of discrimination (Homan 1991; Lee 1993) . In some cases, social science researchers have made conscious decisions not to do certain types of research, or to refrain from publishing the results of research (or parts of research) that they judge to be sensitive and potentially damaging to their research participants. Such decisions remain contentious, given the importance of disseminating research findings as part of the process of knowledge production.
It is important, then, to recognise that 'dual-use' or 'secondary use' of research and innovation can arise in a diversity of fields. While attention should rightly be given to 'the usual suspects' of nuclear and bioscience research, dual-use implications of research in other areas (e.g. in the social sciences) should also be of concern.
Ethical norms, principles and challenges
Dual-use can be presented as a simple dichotomy or conflict between, on the one hand, ensuring national security (that is, public safety and public health), and on the other, protecting academic freedom or liberty and encouraging the pursuit of open science. However, the challenges and principles at stake in dual-use research are far more complex than this simple dichotomy. Table 3 presents, in a simplified fashion, some of the key ethical principles relevant to discussions about dual-use research that were identified in our literature review, along with how these principles can be applied and their implications for governance and regulation.
If we look at the precautionary principle, for example, it has been widely used in European science policy-making with regards to environmental policies to protect biodiversity. This principle promotes the use of precautionary measures in cases where there is a:
. . . threat or potential harm to human health or the environment even if the precise cause and effect relationships cannot be fully established scientifically. (D'Souza and Taghian 2010: 193) While such measures can help avoid considerable harm, they can also have the adverse effect of limiting certain fields of inquiry if they slide from precaution to excessive prudence (e.g. censorship) (Weckert 2007) .
In some cases, research (e.g. on H5N1 virulence) may be promoted even when there is a recognised level of risk, by examining researcher's intentions (is the goal to develop knowledge for malicious purposes?) and/or by giving multiple actors (e.g. government agencies, academic institutions) a responsibility to apply safety measures, such as biosecurity requirements. However, for even the best-intentioned researchers, and even when all appropriate safety measures are implemented, some aspects may still be overlooked, leading to accidents with potentially serious negative consequences (e.g. environmental contamination, publication of sensitive or confidential information). Moreover, the eventual use of the technology by badly intentioned actors may be difficult to anticipate.
In other cases, the risk to public health or national security may be determined to be sufficiently grave that the precautionary principle is applied, over and above an interest in the conduct of open science and knowledge production (Suk et al. 2011 ). This has lead most countries to implement strict controls on the publication and sharing of certain types of nuclear and cryptography research and technology (to be discussed in Section 4.1). Yet, because risk is invariably linked to scientific uncertainty, both with regards to the incidence and magnitude of potential harms, it can be argued that restricting certain behaviours (e.g. data or material sharing, publication) in order to protect the public's interest (e.g. public health, security) cannot outweigh the harm to academic liberty and open science, another public interest (especially when expressed through the language of the 'knowledge society' or 'knowledge economy'). The challenge, then, becomes one of measuring and weighing the different costs and benefits of various interests and the approaches needed to protect them.
Since the above-mentioned norms and principles each have their limitations (e.g. in terms of theory and application), they may be used in a mixed fashion, where different principles are brought to bear depending on the problem at hand. Using more than one approach may offset the weaknesses of another and provide more depth and further understanding of the problem at hand. It is important, however, to recognise that these principles need to be used in a context-specific way, that is, in a complex interrelation with other principles and potentially competing interests (e.g. academic freedom, public health/security, economic development) (Kuzma and Besley 2008) . The application of these and other principles, norms, and guidelines will be explored further throughout this paper.
Research ethics and scientific integrity governance in Canada
In Canada, there are numerous regulatory mechanisms to promote academic integrity and the responsible conduct of research. These mechanisms include policies at all levels: public sector or governmental, institutional, and individual fields of research. The following sections will map out the mechanisms that could apply to dual-use research and innovation, as well as the actors involved.
Laws, regulations and policies
Trade agreements and export laws can have an effect on dual-use research and innovation. Since 'dual-use' has often meant 'military use', the export and trade of technology and components has been restricted to military allies, especially during times of conflict or imminent danger (Fuhrmann 2008) . For example, as previously mentioned, nuclear research and cryptography has long been considered problematic and so classified as dual-use because of the potential harms of (mis)use by foreign powers. Since 1992, Canada has applied a 'dual-use mechanism' in order to have a framework to control the export of specific 'nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and related technology' (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 1994) . This framework is enforced by the member nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (2012). and who are conducting research involving human participants, to submit their projects for ethics review by a research ethics board (REB) at their host institution (e.g. university, research institute, hospital, medical research centre). The REB has the power to require modifications to proposals to ensure that the research meets the highest ethical standards, but this mandate is limited to research involving human participants. It should be noted, however, that the TCPS2 and the TAF apply only to research conducted in institutions receiving funds from one of the three federal granting councils. These guidelines do not apply to research conducted in government or industrial settings, unless the research is done in collaboration with university researchers; nor are there equivalent policies or ethics guidelines for government or private sector research. This creates a notable 'gap' in the current regulatory framework.
While the TAF covers the full range of publicly funded research, there is no equivalent oversight board (e.g. REB) required by this policy, nor mention of dual-use or concerns that ought to be addressed. Nonetheless, the TAF does point to related policies that address dual-use, including the Laboratory BioSafety Guidelines ( Canada's Food and Drug Act (Health Canada 2008) . The Controlled Goods Program is of particular interest since it defines certain 'dual-use goods and technology' that must be registered with the Controlled Goods Directorate, in order to 'safeguard controlled goods within Canada and prevent controlled goods from being accessed by unauthorized persons'. However, these policies focus almost exclusively on 'technologies', 'products' or 'goods', and say very little about the conduct of 'research' or the dissemination of research findings.
Institutional guidelines
From our online search, Health Canada does not appear to have any publicly accessible policies or web pages that use the term 'dual-use'. Industry Canada does have specific web pages and policies, including: a policy on aerospace and defence (Industry Canada 2013), a web page on cyber security (Industry Canada 2008), and three web pages on cryptography policy (Industry Canada 2008 , 2009a , 2009b , 2009c . Industry Canada also provides a performance report on the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy (Health Canada 2005), which includes the 'Establishment of a coherent and effective stewardship framework' in order to:
Increase awareness and understanding of the nature and scope of the dual-use of technologies with respect to research in the biosciences and their current and potential impact on research practices and government policies. (Industry Canada 2008) As might be expected, discussion of civilian-military dualuse was most prevalent at the Department of National Defence (50 web pages mention 'dual-use') and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (14 web pages). Most of these web pages only briefly mention 'dual-use' and are linked to specific military technologies; they invariably neglect upstream research. Moreover, the term 'dual-use' is used in a descriptive manner that omits any normative judgment and thus does not provide guidance on what might be considered beneficial or harmful use.
We conducted an informal email survey of 15 Canadian research universities and identified only three that explicitly mentioned dual-use in their policies. (2012) has a web page that includes examples of research or innovation that require an export permit for 'nuclear-related dual-use equipment or technology'. In these university policies, the term 'dualuse' is invariably associated with the CGP; as such, they mention applications and downstream innovations and do not explicitly address upstream dual-use research.
International guidelines and frameworks
Most national export control mechanisms have been developed to conform to the UN Security Council's prohibition on the acquisition, possession or use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons by non-state parties. The Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, the Australia Group Arrangement in 1985, the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1994, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 all aim to control the spread and use of nuclear, biological or chermical weapons, as well as dual-use goods (Rappert 2008) . None of these regulatory measures specifically discuss dual-use research. The risk that dual-use research poses for society has, however, long been recognised by international organisations such as UNESCO. In 1974, UNESCO specifically addressed the roles and responsibilities of researchers in the development of safe and responsible science while also pinpointing the responsibility of governments to reduce the risk associated with dual-use research through national policies (UNESCO 1974) . These policies must also recognise the free nature of science and the culture of academic liberty that is fundamental for the advancement of knowledge and scientific innovation (UNESCO 1999).
In the EU, the regulation of dual-use research has, as in other national contexts like Canada, focused on controlling dual-use exports ( (Shea 2004) . Enforcement is the responsibility of the Centers for Disease Control, and relies mostly on whistleblowing and self-regulation.
The 2004 US National Research Council report (National Research Council 2004) , identified seven classes of 'experiments of concern', including those that increase pathogen virulence, transmissibility, dissemination and resistance to current treatments or preventive measures. This led to the creation of the NSABB, which launched a working group on codes of conduct for dual-use research (Quirk 2004) . In 2007, the NSABB proposed a 'Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research' (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 2007), which was updated in 2012 and now includes a toolkit for addressing dual-use research (National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity 2012). In these documents, the responsibility for addressing dual-use research concerns lies primarily with researchers, but without providing robust tools to support individual awareness raising and self-regulation. Some responsibility is given to US funding agencies, publishers and institutional review boards, but until very recently, no mention was made of specific government responsibilities to regulate dual-use research.
In March 2012, the US government announced a new policy (Department of Health and Human Services 2012), which requires federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health to screen all research funding proposals for 'dual use research of concern'. As Malakoff (2012: 21) There are also governmental policies to control the export and sale of dual-use technologies and material (Office of Export Control Cooperation 2012), complemented by Project BioShield of America which oversees funding for the development and purchase of vaccines, therapies and diagnostic tools in response to public health emergencies (Buchanan and Kelley 2011) .
Codes of ethics, disciplinary norms or statements
Codes of ethics, disciplinary norms or statements are mechanisms to define the ethical responsibilities of individuals in an institution, a discipline or a field of research. For example, they may outline the social responsibility of the scientist to:
. . . conduct research that they reasonably believe will result in a net benefit for society, and they should avoid conducting research that they have good reasons to believe would produce more harm than good for society. (Resnik and Shamoo 2005: 123) National and international medical associations-such as the American Medical Association, the American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, and the World Medical Association-have included in their codes of ethics, or in separate policy statements, explicit mention of the responsibility of researchers to avoid the development of science with malevolent uses (American Medical Association 2004; Green et al. 2006; Rappert 2008 ). Although they have sometimes been called 'a weapon to counter bioterrorism' (Somerville and Atlas 2005) , codes of ethics are unevenly distributed across disciplines and professions, and many academic or learned societies have not codified their ethical principles (Jones 2007) . Moreover, outside the formal professions (e.g. medicine, nursing, engineering), codes of ethics are not legally binding and cannot constrain or mandate particular behaviours. So while codes of ethics, disciplinary norms and statements will be an important step in building awareness and a sense of responsibility regarding the good conduct of academic research and knowledge dissemination, their enforcement and overall impact may be rather limited.
Academic journals and societies
The publication of weapons development research and information about sensitive technologies (e.g. nuclear, cryptography) has long been restricted, especially when financed by defence departments (Cochrane 1978) . While applicable to areas of national security, restrictive secrecy requirements are deeply unpopular in much of the academic community (Fischer and Zigmond 2010) , because they:
. Undermine fundamental principles of science, such as the Mertonian norms of communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality and scepticism. . Run counter to efforts by academic societies and funding agencies to promote open science that encourages the sharing of data, methods and results (e.g. public data repositories, open access journals, funding of knowledge transfer activities). . Give excessive power to research funders (e.g. defence departments, private industry, funding councils) to control the design and conduct of research, thereby seriously restricting creativity and jeopardizing methodological rigour, and even placing researchers and their institutions in difficult conflicts of interest (e.g. between the interests of academic science and those of the research funders).
Some scholars promoting open science feel that the security benefits derived from government control of knowledge sharing and publication, for example, would actually weaken national security by hindering scientific advancement and so reduce the possibility of having the requisite knowledge and technologies in place to protect against potential dual-use applications (Petro 2004) . Nonetheless, journals in the applied and health sciences, such as PNAS or Nature, have begun developing guidelines on the publication of dual-use research (Cozzarelli 2003) . Norms vary widely, however, and may include a diversity of approaches such as: 1) Do nothing, publish as is, 2) Edit the work to remove potentially harmful details and publish, 3) Publish with a commentary or editorial to place the work into context, 4) Reject on the basis that the security risk is too high. (Salsbury 2011: 97) Furthermore, even if journals have an international readership, they operate within specific national legislative contexts and so must adhere to local policies regarding the publication of dual-use research, technology, methodology, data or material. Certain experts in research integrity, such as Resnik (2010), have advocated for the implementation of dual-use policies for all journals and the promotion of dual-use self-governance in the research community. In part, this focus on self-regulation is due to the recognition that national governments may be limited in their ability to require dual-use policies for journals, especially when the journals are based outside their jurisdiction. Finally, with the move to online open access publishing-and thus the rapid and widespread dissemination of research findings-the feasibility of international policy enforcement to control the publication of dual-use research may be rather limited.
Discussion
Once we understand that the norms of 'open science' and the values that underlie them are not absolute, it becomes evident that the dual use problems should be reconceived as one aspect of a larger optimisation problem: how can policy, broadly understood, help shape the scientific enterprise in such a way as to give due weight both to its distinctive role in producing knowledge and to other relevant values, including, but not restricted to, the reduction of both dual use risks? (Buchanan and Kelley 2013: 196) Our review of Canadian and international guidelines and regulations on dual-use research and innovation shows how different countries have developed various mechanisms to balance the need to support (and benefit from) scientific research while also protecting populations against potential harms to health and security. Numerous policies have been instituted to control the export of dual-use technology and material, but they do not account for the risk caused by the dissemination of findings from dual-use research; as such, these policies can have only limited impact on the sharing of technology, material and knowledge that has become so commoneven a fundamental principle-for the academic community. The reality is that it is much easier to regulate objects (products, agents, components) or even systems than it is to regulate ideas because the latter are not tangible, and so are easily accessible, transferable and diffused to a wide range of individuals, groups and states.
Apart from the NSABB framework in the USA, few national or international regulatory measures lay out detailed mechanisms or procedures to address the dualuse dilemma in research. For example, while the Australian National Framework for the Development of Ethical Principles in Gene Technology (Gene Technology Ethics Committee 2006) mentions avoiding the malevolent use of gene technology (Principle 8), it does not provide recommendations on how to manage such research. By contrast, the WHO (2008) suggests self-governance mechanisms for researchers and publishers (e.g. codes of conduct and restrictions on publications), and recommends the oversight of research and the licensing of researchers or facilities. As in the EU and the UK, the policy focus is on bioscience and nuclear science with little attention given to other fields of research where dual-use may be a concern. Thus, there is little in the way of comprehensive frameworks, regulations, or procedures to address the issues and concerns raised by dual-use research, in Canada or internationally. This lack of clear recommendations or guidelines is likely due to a lack of understanding and consensus amongst members of the academic and policy communities on the definition of 'dual-use research', as well as a widespread perception that dual-use relates exclusively to intentional weapons development.
In Canada, there are various policy and governance mechanisms to, on the one hand, ensure the ethical conduct of research in general (i.e. the TCPS2 and TAF), and on the other, control the development, export and exchange of dual-use innovations or technologies (e.g. export controls). But as should be evident, there will be no single institutional, national or international policy or governance mechanism that can address the full complexity and diversity of challenges raised by dual-use research and innovation. There are simply too many actors and stakeholders involved in the research process-itself a complex and non-linear pathway-and across a diversity of contexts (e.g. public and private research settings, institutions, oversight bodies) (see Fig. 2 ).
Given the complexity and diversity of academic research that may have dual-use potential and implications and the multiple contexts from which they result, very different ethical values, goals and interests will be at stake, some of which may conflict (see Fig. 3 ). It would be unreasonable to expect any one actor to be able to fully comprehend or be responsible for balancing the range of interests and values at stake (e.g. protection of public security in the context of a free sharing of knowledge). Thus, this points towards the need for a multifaceted and (ideally) coordinated approach to the governance of dual-use research in Canada and internationally that can address the different needs, interests, and limitations of the full diversity of actors involved (Bezuidenhout 2012) . But it will be important to recognise that even a multifaceted approach will be imperfect. Scientific uncertainty, and the inability to perfectly understand potential risks and impacts (on health or security), will mean that there will be continued disagreement about what constitutes the most appropriate approach to dealing with dual-use research or innovation in a particular context. Disagreements will have to be managed in such a way as to permit decisions to be made and actions taken, while still respecting as much as possible the interests of all stakeholders involved, including the academic community and the general public.
Possible ways forward
A starting point to better govern dual-use research in Canada, and internationally, could be a risk analysis approach that aligns the type of governance mechanism or intervention with the type of research or potential/ eventual technology, such that the greater the risk, the more need there would be for formal regulation and oversight (see Table 4 ). The TCPS2, the main research ethics policy document in Canada, defines minimal risk research:
. . . as research in which the probability and magnitude of possible harms implied by participation in the research is no greater than those encountered by participants in those aspects of their everyday life that relate to the research. While there may not necessarily be 'participants' in dual-use research, this definition could be modified to help categorise minimal risk dual-use research. Yet, unlike the case of human subjects research where the identification of risks to participants may be foreseeable (e.g. risk of stigmatisation in culturally specific research, physical harm from the administration of pharmaceutical drugs), it may be difficult to name the potential harmful use or quantify its risk of occurrence for a type of research or innovation (e.g. foreseeable environmental risks), even more so if researchers or governing instances are not aware of the problem. This risk analysis approach can thus only be a first-level evaluation of dual-use potential, and will be an on-going process involving surveillance and education by a range of actors and regulatory systems, e.g. units within universities (biohazard committee), funding agencies (through peer-review committees, annual reports from researchers) and government institutions.
With these qualifiers in mind, we can modify the TCPS2 definition of minimal risk to apply to dual-use, as follows:
. . . research in which the probability and magnitude of possible harms towards society is no greater than those encountered in everyday life.
Research or innovations meeting this definition would have no obvious or foreseeable potential dual-use application, would be placed in the low/minimal risk category, and so be governed by the tenets of open science, such as For research where there is a medium dual-use risk potential, the probability and magnitude of possible harms towards society is approximately equal to the benefits encountered by society. This could be the case of genetic research aiming to develop personalised medicines or 'designer babies', or ethnographic studies to understand the culture of vulnerable populations, which could also lead to discrimination or racial profiling. Mechanisms to reduce the risk of this type of research might include building awareness in the scientific community through education and academic codes of conduct, something that could be led by respected learned societies (e.g. the UK's Royal Society) and research funders, whether they be philanthropic (e.g. the UK Wellcome Trust) or government bodies (e.g. the Canadian Tri-Councils). Further, as experience with institutional review boards in the USA and REBs in Canada has shown in the context of research ethics, there is also an important place for local and national review committees to both evaluate the contextspecific risks of particular research projects, and to participate in continuing education amongst the academic research community about the dual-use concerns raised by particular fields of inquiry and innovation.
Finally, research where the probability and magnitude of possible harms to society far outweigh the likely benefits would be categorised as high or serious dual-use risk. This would include nuclear physics and some types of biological research (e.g. on the synthesis of hybrid and/or virulent viruses), where the potential for accidental loss of control could have a devastating effect on a region or entire country (as in Fukushima, Japan). Such risks could, however, be greatly reduced through the imposition of strong precautionary mechanisms, such as government regulations, international conventions, as well as the aforementioned institutional mechanisms (e.g. review boards).
As is common with risk management strategies more generally, for the three risk categories, the mechanism used to govern dual-use research and innovation should be proportional to the probability and magnitude of harm. But for each type of governance mechanism, it will also be important to reflect on the particular advantages/disadvantages and interests for the various actors and stakeholders involved-and involve them in the determination of risk-and the applicability of the mechanism to a particular type of research or innovation (Hermansson and Hansson 2007) . So for example, while export controls may be justified in high-risk dual-use research and innovation-such as some areas of nuclear physics, cryptography or bioscience-the limits imposed will nonetheless be very costly, both in terms of bureaucracy and restrictions on academic liberty and scientific progress. By contrast, in research that is purely conceptual, e.g. in philosophy or mathematics, the cost of imposing government control mechanisms would be disproportionate to the risk of dual-use, and so most probably unjustified. Table 5 presents a diversity of mechanisms that could be used to deal with particular dual-use situations, following a first general risk analysis (see Table 4 ). The possible governance mechanisms are ranked according to their level of coercion, from the least control to maximal control.
On the international stage, research ethics and scientific integrity in the context of dual-use research is generally a shared responsibility amongst policy-makers, public and private funding organisations, universities, REBs and researchers. These responsibilities are still unclear in Canada since they are rarely specified in policy, but responsibility will certainly differ depending on the actor, the context and the research process. National guidelines on dual-use research must reflect the reality of open science, but also recognise the risks associated with shared knowledge. Only multilevel collaboration amongst the actors and stakeholders involved can provide a justified management system for dual-use research and innovation. . . . research that may intentionally or unintentionally have both beneficial and harmful applications or consequences, including knowledge, processes, and technologies from the natural and applied sciences, the health sciences, and the social sciences.
This can help to move the discussion beyond an overly restricted focus on traditional military applications of the applied sciences and biosciences, to also include other disciplines, such as the social sciences. This will help ensure that the full range of pertinent research and technology is considered, something that is particularly important in a context of interdisciplinary research and convergence between once disparate bodies of knowledge (e.g. nanotechnology, psychology and neuroscience). A broad definition of dual-use research and innovation should also cover all steps of the research process, including 'upstream' conception and discovery, and not only the final 'downstream' publication or technological application.
6.2.2 Promote shared responsibility. It is essential to recognise that no one actor (individual, group, agency) can be fully responsible for identifying and managing problematic dual-use research and innovation. So while it is necessary that the key actors involved in research and innovation-i.e. researchers, institutions, journals and governments-are responsible for what they know and have the power to address (Kuhlau et al. 2008) , they must also recognise the limits of their responsibilities and the need to collaborate with the relevant actors (e.g. citizens).
6.2.3
Promote development of coordinated mechanisms. Academic institutions, national and international academic communities, learned societies, philanthropic organisations and government funding agencies, and governments should collaborate in the development of diverse but coordinated mechanisms-ranging from education and self-governance, to review committees and formal regulation-to address appropriately the issues and challenges raised by dual-use research and innovation. Given the different powers and responsibilities of the actors involved, this will require efforts at local, institutional, national and international levels.
6.2.4 Decentralisation and context-specific awareness/education. The Canadian and international academic communities should work to build awareness and educate their members about dual-use research and innovation, in research institutions, through disciplinary associations and learned societies, on editorial boards of scientific journals, and via funding bodies. It is important for all involved to recognise the real difficulty in identifying and evaluating the potential risk (likelihood and magnitude) of dual-use research and innovation. As such, raising awareness of the potential for dual-use in a diversity of research and innovation contexts becomes essential. This could take the form of mandatory courses for researchers (and regulators) on the implications of conducting high-risk dual-use research, as proposed in the USA (National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity 2012). Voluntary mechanisms, such as participation in online courses by the academic community (Bollaert and Whitby 2012; Center for Science Technology and Security Policy 2012)-including students, researchers and REBsand regular discussions at academic meetings (conferences, workshops) would also be important for building greater awareness on the issue of dual-use as it occurs across disciplines and fields of research, and how it can be managed appropriately.
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